Elections as a Proxy for War
The Seamless Transition of Warlords to Politicians in Africa
Across the African continent, the transformation of warlords and military strongmen into elected politicians is neither rare nor surprising. From Liberia to Uganda, Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo, former soldiers and rebel leaders have traded camouflage for suits, shifting from battlefield command to political office. It begs the question: are elections merely a continuation of war by other means?
The Logic of the Battlefield in the Ballot Box
Elections in post-conflict societies often follow the logic of war. The same warlords who once commanded troops now command political constituencies, leveraging their wartime networks, resources, and reputations to secure votes. In countries where conflict has shaped national identity and governance structures, the ability to wield power, whether through force or electoral influence, becomes a measure of political legitimacy.
Charles Taylor in Liberia, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda all built their political careers on military success. Their narratives of war and struggle became political capital, allowing them to transition from armed leadership to elected office with minimal resistance. In places where the state was either absent or complicit in conflict, warlords became de facto rulers, filling power vacuums that remained even after peace accords were signed.
A Voter Base Built on Fear and Loyalty
Warlords-turned-politicians understand that war is not just about guns, it is about mobilisation. Many command unwavering loyalty from their former soldiers, local communities, and ethnic groups, who view them as protectors or deliverers of stability. Their past actions, whether brutal or strategic, often create a sense of inevitability about their leadership.
In some cases, their electoral victories are underpinned by fear. Voters remember the alternative, chaos, reprisals, and violence. In societies without strong institutions, the choice at the ballot box often mirrors the choice in war: aligning with a strongman who can guarantee security and resources.
The Erosion of Democratic Norms
When warlords become politicians, democratic institutions rarely thrive. Elections become a performance rather than a true contest. The tools of war - intimidation, patronage, and the silencing of opposition - persist in political spaces. Former fighters leverage their control over security forces, economic assets, and even international goodwill to maintain their grip on power.
As a result, democracy is often hollowed out. The mere act of holding elections does not ensure a transition from violence to governance; instead, it institutionalises the dominance of those who once ruled by force. Countries like Sudan and the DRC continue to struggle with this paradox, where military influence remains the determining factor in politics, even under civilian rule.
The Rising Influence of Civilian Populations
However, the equation is shifting in some countries where the militarily weak, particularly women, youth, and non-combatant civilians, outnumber former warlords at the ballot box. These demographics, historically marginalised in war-driven politics, are increasingly asserting themselves through activism, civil society movements, and electoral participation.
In Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's rise to power marked a critical moment where civilian governance took precedence over military dominance. In Sudan, the youth-led protests that ousted Omar al-Bashir demonstrated the growing influence of non-military actors in shaping political outcomes. Women-led movements in countries like Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic have also been instrumental in challenging former warlords' grip on power.
Yet, challenges remain. Many warlords-turned-politicians still wield economic and coercive power, ensuring that democratic openings remain fragile. The struggle between civilian governance and the entrenched power structures of former combatants continues to define the future of electoral politics in post-conflict Africa, as ballot box democracy fails to reflect their will.
The Cycle of Power
The transition of warlords into politicians is not accidental, it is strategic. War and politics are two sides of the same coin in many African states, where power is rarely relinquished without a fight. Elections may replace battlefields, but the competition remains the same: a contest for dominance, often fought with the same ruthlessness as war itself.
Until institutions replace personalities, and governance becomes about policy rather than survival, elections will continue to function as a proxy for war. The battlefield may change, but the rules of engagement remain strikingly familiar.
I realise you made a play on von Clausewitz’s quote; “war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means”, and state that war and politics are two sides of the same coin in African states. Let’s take this further, war and politics are the two sides of the same coin all over the world and not just in Africa.
The natural state of things is towards disorder (cue: the second law of entropy), what war is, is a means of controlling the chaos so that it works in your favour. If this is accepted, then it is war that is the natural state, not elections. What elections then are, are simply a mutation or perhaps a transmogrification of an exoergic state of affairs conducted by a trained select few to one that appears to less chaotic (but in essence isn’t), ie elections conducted by the many. They are both a form of war.
Bingo!
And I also think the continued growth of democracy is a stress test on the status quo. If those who acquire power through the butt of the gun cannot retain it through the ballot, will we go back to warfare?